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Peru's President Alberto Fujimori dismissed Gen. Nicolas de Bari Hermoza Rios as chairman of
the joint chiefs of staff on Aug. 20, replacing him with former defense minister Gen. Cesar Enrique
Saucedo Sanchez. Gen. Julio Salazar Monroe, who had been nominal head of the Servicio de
Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), took over as defense minister. Fujimori also returned longtime ally
Alberto Pandolfi to the post of prime minister to replace Javier Valle Riestra (see NotiSur, 08/14/98).
Hermoza had long been considered one of the three most powerful people in Peru, along with
Fujimori and the de facto head of intelligence, Valdimiro Montesinos.
Hermoza's ouster was first seen as a possible indication that Fujimori was asserting his authority
over the military. More likely, however, is that the troika has become a duo, with Montesinos
emerging at least on a par with the president in power. Fujimori has never enjoyed a solid political-
party base and relied heavily on Hermoza for support throughout his eight years in the presidency.
This was most evident when the president carried out his self-coup in April 1992, closing Congress
and essentially ruling by decree.
Peru's military leadership traditionally was appointed according to seniority and rotated each year.
Hermoza was scheduled to step down in 1992, but the law was changed following the self-coup,
and Hermoza has seemed solidly entrenched ever since. "Hermoza Rios offered invaluable political
support to the president," said Gen. Rodolfo Robles, who spent several months in political exile
in 1993 after criticizing Hermoza Rios (see NotiSur, 12/13/96). "After the coup he turned the army
into the political party that the president didn't have." Presence of tanks send signal to Hermoza
Hermoza's ouster came on Aug. 21, and Fujimori appointed Gen. Saucedo to replace him the same
day.
Two hours before his dismissal, press reports said, Hermoza believed the meeting he had been
called to attend was to examine the situation on the border with Ecuador (see NotiSur, 08/14/98).
Hermoza was told his dismissal was the price for the withdrawal of Ecuadoran troops from the
border and reciprocity for the change of command in the Ecuadoran military. Hermoza was told the
changes had the backing of army commanders, as did Saucedo's appointment to replace him. At the
time Hermoza was informed of his ouster and in the days following, troop and tank presence in the
capital was heavy.
Political analysts said Hermoza's removal came after months of patient maneuvering to lessen the
general's strength within the armed forces so that the military would not object to his eventual
ouster. Nine months earlier, Fujimori had tried to dismiss Hermoza but was thwarted when the
general called the military commanders to Lima in a show of force. Since then, the president and
the general have clashed frequently, political analysts said. After both Hermoza Rios and Fujimori
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claimed sole credit for the 1997 rescue at the Japanese ambassador's residence, Hermoza's exit was
only a matter of time (see NotiSur, 04/25/97).
Ecuador's troop incursion on the border provided Fujimori with the opportunity that he and
Montesinos were waiting for. Diplomatic sources in Lima said the Rio de Janeiro Protocol guarantor
countries Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US asked the new administration of Ecuadoran President
Jamil Mahuad to replace military commanders to reduce tensions and avoid new incidents on the
border. Mahuad agreed, asking in return that Peru do the same. The guarantor countries were
happy to provide the excuse to oust Hermoza because he was considered a hawk who had little
interest in a diplomatic solution to the longstanding border dispute. "The decisive factor in his
dismissal was Ecuador," said Fernando Rospigliosi, political analyst for the daily La Republica.
"It seems that Hermoza Rios was one of the military who pressured to increase the tension with
Ecuador while Fujimori was trying to reach a final peace agreement."
Although Rospigliosi indicated US pressure for a peace treaty also strengthened Fujimori's hand,
on Aug. 26, Pandolfi denied that US pressure played a part in Hermoza's dismissal. "Just as the
president kept Hermoza for seven years, in the same way he now considered it convenient to change
him," said the prime minister. Meanwhile, Ecuador's new head of the joint chiefs of staff, Gen.
Patricio Nunez, said he foresees greater flexibility from Peru now that Hermoza has been replaced.
"Conditions for negotiation have not changed," said Nunez. "Possibly Peru will have a little more
understanding and comprehension, given that Gen. Hermoza was the hard-liner and the most
recalcitrant among the Peruvian armed forces."
Montesinos comes out the winner
The other power in Peru's "civilian-military dictatorship" is Montesinos, behind-the-scenes head
of intelligence. Firing Hermoza brought early speculation that Fujimori was again trying to soften
the government's repressive and undemocratic image, particularly concerning human rights, as he
moves toward a re-election bid. Both Montesinos and Hermoza have long been accused of human
rights abuses, including torture and killing. As Montesinos' enhanced power becomes clearer,
however, little softening is detectable.
Defense Minister Gen. Salazar is not only a close ally of Montesinos, but was willing to be head of
intelligence in name only, and is thus considered malleable. With Salazar's move to the Defense
Ministry, Montesinos is more like to be openly named to head the SIN, said Rospigliosi. Not
only is Salazar used to having Montesinos in command, he is also considered weak because of
his connections to well- know human rights cases, including the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta
killings and the torture of former intelligence agent Leonor LaRosa (see NotiSur, 01/04/94, 05/20/94,
07/07/95, 04/04/98).
Salazar was also legally responsible for the recent case of wiretapping against hundreds of
politicians, diplomats, and journalists, said Rospigliosi. The press noted that Montesinos, a former
army captain, would be in a favored position in 1999 and 2000, when his 1966 military class would
have taken over leadership in the army. But within days, it was clear he would not have to wait.
Reuters quoted military sources as saying Montesinos has taken control of the army by placing
trusted allies in key posts after Hermoza's ouster. In 15 changes in top military ranks, men who
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graduated with Montesinos received promotions outside the normal timetable. Key moves in the
army's geographical divisions include putting Gen. Carlos Indacochea in charge of Lima, the region
with the most firepower, and naming Gen. Abraham Cano to head the key region around Peru's
second city of Arequipa.
Following similar appointments in January, four of the six army regions are now headed by
Montesinos' classmates. One remaining challenge for Montesinos will be to convince the US that he
is not the Rasputin in the Fujimori administration. He has a long list of accusations, including having
at one time been on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) payroll, as well as numerous human
rights violations, heading a death squad, and protecting drug traffickers.
No charges have ever been proved, however, in part because Montesinos operates in the shadows
and studiously avoids publicity. Regardless of the reasons behind the changes, what has not
changed are Fujimori's ambition for a third term and the military's intention to hang on to its share
of power. [Sources: The Miami Herald, 08/21/98; Chicago Tribune, Clarin (Argentina), 08/22/98; El
Nuevo Herald (Miami), 08/21/98, 08/24/98; Inter Press Service, 08/24/98; Reuters, 08/20/98, 08/21/98,
08/25/98; Notimex, 08/20/98, 08/21/98, 08/25/98, 08/26/98]
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